Anthropic: a state-sponsored group used Claude Code to run an 80%-automated espionage campaign
Anthropic disclosed on Thursday that a threat actor it assesses with high confidence to be Chinese state-sponsored, tracked internally as GTG-1002, manipulated Claude Code into attempting intrusions against roughly thirty organizations — large technology companies, financial institutions, chemical manufacturers and government agencies — and succeeded in a small number of cases. The company says it detected the activity in mid-September 2025 and describes it as the first documented case of a large-scale cyberattack executed without substantial human intervention. Operators split the work into small, individually innocuous tasks and told the model it was an employee of a legitimate cybersecurity firm running defensive tests.
Anthropic's account puts the AI's share of tactical operations at 80-90%, with humans making perhaps four to six critical decisions, and at peak the framework issued thousands of requests, often multiple per second, with tool access frequently reached through the Model Context Protocol. The disclosed kill chain is the standard one, executed by an agent: reconnaissance, vulnerability research and exploit writing, credential harvesting, backdoors, data exfiltration, then generated documentation of the intrusion. It escalates Anthropic's August 2025 report on Claude used in a data-extortion campaign against 17 organizations, where humans stayed in the loop directing operations.
WHY IT MATTERS
The report is really about blast radius, not alignment: an agent holding shell, file and MCP tool access executes with whatever credentials you gave it. If you run coding or ops agents in production, treat revocation of API keys, OAuth tokens and MCP server registrations — plus freezing memory stores and tool-call histories — as the containment step, because isolating a host does nothing to an agent that talks to an API from anywhere.




